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Abstract 
Agile is the contemporary development practice of choice but security has been claimed as a challenge 
for it. This thesis investigates whether agile methods can be used for security-critical software and if the 
reason why the majority of Norwegian companies deviate from the agile methodology in their 
development is linked to security, by looking at the security requirements. A questionnaire and 
interviews of Norwegian companies were undertaken, and while the questionnaire did not yield any 
results the data from the interview indicate that the reasons for not conforming to the methodology 
appear to be related to security work and assurance. Agile is implied by the limited sample size to not 
only be useable for security-critical software but may be the best option in projects with uncertainty to 
the system and changing security requirements. 
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Sammendrag 
Smidige utviklingsmetoder har blitt standard praksis for programvareutvikling i dag, men har møtt 
anklagelser for å ikke lage sikre programmer. Denne masteroppgaven tar for seg spørsmålet om smidig 
utvikling kan brukes for å utvikle sikkerhetskritisk programvare og om grunnen til at mesteparten av 
norske bedrifter gjør avvik fra de smidige metodene er på grunn av sikkerhet, ved å se på behandlingen 
av sikkerhetskrav. For å undersøke dette ble det gjort en spørreundersøkelse og intervjuer av norske 
bedrifter. Selv om det ikke kom noen resultater gjennom spørreundersøkelsen, kom det fram av 
intervjuene at avvik var grunnet sikkerhet og da spesielt måtene det ble forsikret om at 
sikkerhetskravene var gjennomført. Smidig utvikling er implisert av det begrensete utvalget å kunne 
brukes i utvikling av sikkerhetskritisk programvare, spesielt der det er stor usikkerhet til hvordan 
systemet skal være eller sikkerhetskravene endres fortløpende.
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
Iterative development has been known since long before agile was coined as a term in software 
development through the creation of the agile manifesto by Beck et al (2001). Today it is widely 
recognized as the thing to do and many developers embrace the methodology as it is something the 
customer expects. There are some challenges inherited to the methodologies in agile, among them 
security. A majority of the established security assurance methods fall outside agile thinking (Beznosov 
and Kruchten 2004). Critique has also been made that agile does not make secure code due to a lack of 
security expertise on the field (Sullivan 2010) and agile methods are seen as inadequate by theoretical 
analyses (Bartsch 2011). After the revelations of Edward Snowden and the more recent Heartbleed 
vulnerability in OpenSSL (Heartbleed), security has received worldwide attention. This study sets out to 
see if there has been any changes and if agile is now more fit for security-heavy projects, taking 
advantage of the increased awareness surrounding the topic. 
1.1 Background 
 
In a pre-project study done ahead of this research (Knudsen 2013), investigation was done as to whether 
security meshed well with agile development methods. Through state-of-the-art research in published 
scientific studies and a case study at a Norwegian company, the pre-project study sought to answer 
three research questions: 
 Could agile development methods be used for security-critical software? 
 How did the use of agile development method affect the security requirements? 
 How was agile development done with security-heavy projects in practice? 
While enough information was gathered to form an answer to the second research question, research 
into agile development for security in practice led to a discovery that made answering the first 
impossible in the given timeframe. Of the three practical examples studied, only one stayed true to the 
key principles and methods of the chosen agile development method and only did so through thorough 
reworking of their security development approach (O’Boyle and Eng 2013). Both the NASA development 
team (Trimble and Webster 2012) and the team in the case study had their own variation of an agile 
development method fitted their needs. Furthermore a published study of Norwegian companies’ use of 
agile development methods came out towards the end of the pre-project study. The published study had 
81% of the 552 companies responding saying they did use an agile development method, but the 
majority of these respondents also deviated from the method’s key values and principles (Brevik and 
Grønli 2013). Following the assumption that at least some of these would be working on security-critical 
software, any answer for the first research question without further research into the reasons for 
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deviating from agile principles would be flawed. 
From a paper by Beznosov and Kruchten (2004) conventional security assurance methods could be seen 
divided into four groups of methods, two of them which were either innate in agile or independent of 
any development methods. The third group they wrote could be feasibly covered through automated 
tools. Methods from the fourth group, consisting of half of all the security assurance methods, were 
deemed incompatible for agile development methods. In one of the two proposed strategies for these 
mismatching assurance methods, they suggested developing new agile-friendly security assurance 
methods but could not offer any of their own. This was ten years ago. 
1.2 Study focus and Research Questions 
 
This study will focus on getting a more definitive answer through investigating the reasons of deviation in 
Norwegian companies, with a focus on the security requirements and assurance of these in agile 
development. 
Research questions for this study are: 
 
RQ1: How is security affected in deviations of agile development? Are the reasons for 
nonconformity security related?  
 RQ2: Can agile development methods be used for security-critical software? 
 
The rest of the document is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the research methods used in the 
study. Section 3 holds the results gathered through the research methods. Section 4 provides discussion 
of the results. Section 5 is the conclusions from the study. 
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Section 2: Research Methods 
2.1 Choice of Strategy and Methods 
 
In selecting the research strategies for answering the research questions, the six strategies detailed in 
Researching Information Systems and Computing (Oates 2006 p. 35) were studied. RQ1 focuses on how 
the security requirements are affected when developed with a deviating agile method. It also seeks to 
discover if the reason for the deviation is security related. As such, survey is an eligible strategy because 
of its use to form generalized conclusions about how security is affected (Oates 2006 p.104). On the 
other hand, the depth to answer if the reasons are security related may be lacking, as the focus is on 
getting a larger coverage over going into depth about the researched topic (Oates 2006 p.105). It also 
only provides answers to how it is right now and requires the replier to both know enough of the topic to 
answer and being honest when answering the survey. The design and creation strategy is unsuitable for 
the first research question since it is not about creating a new artefact. An experimentation strategy is 
not viable as the research question is no hypothesis that is to be proven or disproved. If it was, it would 
have required a test group to run through a project. While agile methods lead to shorter development 
cycles it would take at least a month to run through an iteration of the project. As experiments should be 
repeated to be certain that outside factors do not affect the result (Oates 2006 p.127-128), an 
experimentation strategy is unfeasible due to time limitations, lack of participant group and the difficulty 
of removing outside factors on a method that is based on continuous improvement both of the project 
and its members. Case studies focus on the case under investigation in its real world application, 
focusing on the depth instead of breadth and exploring all the factors of the case (Oates 2006 p.141-
142). For RQ1 it is a viable strategy as the question seeks answers to the reasons behind the method 
deviation and how security is affected. However, the answers coming from such a strategy cannot be 
used to make a generalization for other environments and have less grounding to answer the second 
part of the question. It may also be hard to find a project where it is known that the developers use a 
deviation of an agile method. For action research to be a good strategy, the research question should be 
focused on improving an already existing method. Ethnography deals with understanding cultures or 
groups of people (Oates 2006 p. 35), which is unsuitable for RQ1. 
RQ2 seeks an answer to whether agile development methods can be used for security-critical software. A 
yes or no answer is desired, so the generalization possibility of a survey is viable but comes with the cost 
of possibly overseeing the reasons to the answer (Oates 2006 p.104). Like the first research question, 
both the design and creation strategy as well as the experimentation strategy are unsuitable. Design and 
creation because the thesis is not about the construction of an artefact and experimentation due to time 
limitation, lack of participation group and removing outside factors in the experiment. A case study 
strategy is advantageous for this research question due to appropriateness for situations where the 
researcher has little control and exploration of alternative meanings and explanations, according to 
Oates (2006 p.150). He also makes note that it is sometimes perceived to be leading towards 
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generalization with poor credibility, time-consuming to set up and the presence of the researcher may 
affect the results (Oates 2006 p.150 - 151). In opposition to the survey strategy, a case study will give a 
lot of depth but lack the width to form a strong generalized answer to the research question. Action 
research is unsuitable because of its focus on improvement of a method in practice, as described in the 
advantages of such a research by Oates (2006 p.168). There is no research group for this study and 
conducting it by the researcher alone, while being agile, can lead to self-delusion as warned by Oates 
(2006 p.160). The result of such a study strategy is also questionable, as some IT researchers do not 
accept it as a strategy or criticize it for lack of rigor and inability to establish cause and effect outcomes 
that can be generalized (Oates 2006 p.168). Likewise is ethnography not a good strategy, as it focuses on 
people and the research question is about a method. 
Considering the strategy advantages and disadvantages, there are two viable strategies for both research 
questions. Survey and case study. The time allotted to this thesis is twenty weeks so the use of two 
strategies would be too time consuming, especially considering case studies’ nature of providing a lot of 
information about specific instances that must be processed and time used for setting it all up. RQ1 
needs a grounded answer that a case study is useful for, whereas RQ2 seeks a generalized statement 
that was also an unanswered part of the pre-project study. As the pre-project study was a case study and 
out of a personal desire from the researcher to contribute more data for the research field, it was 
decided to use a survey strategy for this master’s thesis on both research questions. 
Four different data generation methods are mentioned by Oates (2006 p.36) to produce empirical data. 
Interview, observation, questionnaire and documents. The data produced is either qualitative or 
quantitative. It has already been mentioned that a grounded answer is called for in RQ1 without the 
specific need for a wide generalization. As such qualitative data is sought. Interviews are described by 
Oates (2006 p. 187) to be suitable data generation methods when detailed information is sought, the 
questions are complex or open-ended or the issues investigated are sensitive or hard to observe. 
Matters of security are a sensitive topic that many may not wish to part with openly, so an interview is a 
viable data generation method. The other side of it is not many may wish to be interviewed or reveal too 
much about their own practices. Likewise does observation face some of the same issues as not only is 
the researcher there to learn how security is done, they are also watching as the work being conducted 
or discussed. Depending on the type of observation used, some disadvantages may lie in the restrictions 
of studying behavior without getting to know the reasons or lack of reliability due to the research 
depending highly upon the researcher conducting the observation (Oates 2006 p. 214-215). On the other 
side, it is described to provide a rich insight into the social setting, and what people really do (Oates 2006 
p. 214). While easy to set up, it may be difficult to get the reasoning behind the decisions carried out in 
practice with observations alone. In RQ1’s case, trying to extract information about how security is 
affected in an observation alone may be difficult and more so whether the reasons for method deviation 
is security related without asking for it specifically. Questionnaires are best suited to situations where 
the researcher wants to obtain data from a large number of people, get brief and uncontroversial 
information and have the data standardized (Oates 2006 p. 220). It is also economical in that it costs very 
little in materials and time compared to other data generation methods (Oates 2006 p. 229). Some of the 
Page 9 of 44 
 
disadvantages lie in frustration that predefined answers do not match the responder’s experience, the 
answers may be biased in the researcher’s view or the responder may not answer truthfully (Oates 2006 
p. 230). A response rate of thirty percent would be considered good and ten percent not unexpected for 
questionnaires (Oates 2006 p. 99), so getting a large enough sampling frame is important. For RQ1 the 
responses from a questionnaire may be too shallow to provide a good answer without relying on open 
questions, which there should not be too many of in a questionnaire because they take longer to answer 
and increases the chance that the responder will not complete it. Questionnaires will however give a 
strong indication to whether nonconformity is security-related, the second part of RQ1. Documents as a 
data generation method have the advantages of being cheap, easy to obtain and work based on them 
can be checked by other researchers as most of them remain permanently available (Oates 2006 p. 241). 
More sensitive and confidential documents are harder to be permitted access to, and may be protected 
by law from viewing (Oates 2006 p. 236). How security is handled in a company may be too sensitive for 
a researcher to gain access to through documents, making other data generation methods such as 
interviews be less intrusive and more readily agreeable for the respondents. Research articles based on 
agile and security requirements is thus a better approach in the data generation method but from 
experience in the pre-project study, the actual number of good articles here including both security and 
agile development is in the minority.  
In RQ2’s case, the data collected must be viable to form a definite yes or no with enough support to form 
a reason to the answer. While interviews can provide the depth and reasoning, it has the drawback of 
needing a lot of time and effort that usually make them unsuitable for drawing generalized conclusions, 
since it would a large number of interviews to get a big enough sample size (Oates 2006 p. 199). 
Observations fall in the same boat where the number required and only watching behavior and actions 
will not provide either reasoning or answer to the research question.  A questionnaire on the other hand 
would be a very viable data generation method as long as the questions can form the reason for whether 
agile methodology can be used for security-critical applications, with reasoning beyond only a statistical 
number or the idea that if the majority does it then it must be right. With a large enough sample size, it 
can be used to make a generalized conclusion. The sample size for documents is, as has been mentioned, 
too low to be of good use for RQ2. Research articles may help contribute to the answer but is not 
enough to form data on its own. 
Considering that neither observation nor documents contribute to the research questions the same way 
as the other two, the choice of data generation method falls on interview or questionnaire. Due to the 
number required for a good sample size and the warning that interviews are time-consuming for the 
researcher (Oates 2006 p. 198), questionnaire was chosen as the main data collection method since a 
part of RQ1 and the whole of RQ2 ask for a generalized answer. The need for more than just quantitative 
data, especially in RQ1, means that a part of the questionnaire must contain open questions so the 
respondents can answer with their own thoughts and experiences. Because questionnaires have the 
advantage of being low cost in materials and time (Oates 2006 p. 229), interviews were added as a 
second data generation method to produce more data on the field and increase the research quality 
through method triangulation (Oates 2006 p. 37). Tertiary the findings of the pre-project study and other 
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research articles will be used to compare with the results of the other methods, but will not be among 
the data generation methods of this thesis. 
2.2 Conducting the Survey 
 
To answer the research questions the methods used must be able to generate data on the following: 
 If the respondents use agile development methodology in projects with high security 
requirements (RQ2). 
 Why they use/do not use agile methods in high security projects (RQ2). 
 If any changes has been made to the agile methods used and what they are. Especially if they are 
related to security (RQ1, RQ2). 
 How work with security requirements change based on the security level of the project (RQ1, 
RQ2). 
Indirectly related to the topic, information about what agile methodology was used and how they 
assured the security requirements had been met were also sought. 
It has already been established that the data generation methods of questionnaire and interviews will be 
used for this thesis. How they were used to generate data is written in the two subsections below.  
2.2.1 Conducting the Questionnaire 
 
Some warnings regarding questionnaires are getting only ten percent response rate on a questionnaire is 
not uncommon (Oates 2006 p. 99),that unsolicited questionnaires are regarded as junk mail by many 
people (Oates 2006 p. 102) and spam filters may prevent bulk emails from even reaching the recipients 
(Oates 2006 p. 102). As such an interest group for the Norwegian information and communication 
industry, IKT-Norge, was approached with the plea for assistance. They were willing to send out the 
questionnaire alongside their organization email, provided it was not too long and sensitive and passed a 
review of their own. It was believed that through them, the response rate would be significantly higher 
and reach a larger number of people than had the researcher tried to construct an own email list. While 
the sample size of possible respondents is unknown, it should be possible through this probability 
sampling technique of Norwegian ICT companies to get a sample of respondents indicative of the overall 
population (Oates 2006 p. 96) and so enable generalization for the research questions. 
The questionnaire was built through online survey software (SurveyMonkey). Because of the limitations 
of ten questions and a hundred respondents in their free model, a monthly subscription was purchased 
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to grant unlimited questions and up to a thousand and more respondents. Considering Brevik and Grønli( 
2013) had over five hundred respondents to their own research, it was felt as a liability to put the limit to 
only a hundred even if the chance for so many answers could be low. It was considered to additionally 
put the questionnaire up online on an international and a Norwegian forum to generate more data. It 
was elected not because not only would this add to the cost of running the questionnaire by possibly 
going past the monthly subscription answers, this form of non-probabilistic sampling would only provide 
a weak basis for generalization (Oates 2006 p.96). It would also cast doubt to the reliability of the 
answers as it is unknown how much experience the respondents on the forums have with the topics of 
the thesis. There is also the possibility that the forum respondent also had answered the questionnaire 
sent through IKT-Norge. 
The first two questions of the questionnaire were made to expedite completion for those that that did 
not use an agile methodology in development. To pick up whether it was related to security, the 
recipients were asked to explain why they were not using it. No mention of security was made here to 
avoid leading on a reason tied to it. The next questions were tied to determining whether the 
respondents were using a deviation of agile security methodology and the rest of the questionnaire were 
Likert scales (Oates 2006 p. 223-224) on differences between security requirements and other system 
requirements. A textbox was left for explanation to the differences if the respondents wished to express 
it further. The Likert scales revolved around the agile principles of welcoming change, delivery of working 
software, process improvement and customer collaboration; as these principles were considered the 
most important for the thesis out of the twelve principles mentioned on the agile manifesto page (Beck 
et al. 2001). 
Prior to the questionnaire being sent out, the questions were worked out in conjunction with the master 
thesis supervisor. The questionnaire was sent first to four colleagues as a pilot test, with three 
respondents and two having suggestions for improvements. After finalizing the form, the link of it was 
sent to IKT-Norge for approval and subsequently being sent in their email letter. 
The email address of the researcher was added to the questionnaire if the recipients had any questions 
or volunteered for an interview to speak on the subject. It was explicitly stated that responses would be 
anonymous and even if the companies were to contact the researcher, there would be no way to tie the 
email to any specific response. 
See appendix 1 for the questionnaire. 
2.2.2 Conducting the Interviews 
 
The questions made for the interviews were derived from the questions used in the questionnaire but 
ordered differently in different themes. First were questions about the choice and use of agile 
methodology, then the interviewees were asked to relate their experiences comparing security 
requirements or high security projects with more ordinary ones. Last security assurance related to 
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security requirements was touched upon before an open question at the end. Most of the questions 
were also open-ended to require more than a yes or no answer. 
The interviews were structured in a semi-structured fashion, allowing the themes and questions that 
were identical for all interviews but also giving the possibility of asking questions about issues raised by 
the interviewee (Oates 2006 p. 188). Oates (2006 p. 188) also warns that such interviews are not useful 
for research conclusions that draw conclusions for the population, because the same topics may not be 
addressed or the number of cases are few. Primarily the interviews are intended to provide an in-depth 
answer to RQ1 while contributing to the conclusions. There is a chance that none of the interviewees use 
a deviation of an agile methodology for their development projects but as the majority of Norwegian 
companies were determined to do such a deviation by Brevik and Grønli (2013) when agile methodology 
was in use and that half the security assurance methods fell outside the agile methodology (Beznosov 
and Kruchten 2004), the researcher is confident at least one case will provide answers. 
Due to time and cost of travel as well as money already being spent on the questionnaire subscription, 
local IT companies in the Trondheim region were approached for interviews. As the interviews were 
intended to answer in-depth instead of forming generalization for the research question, the non-
probabilistic approach of purposive sampling (Oates 2006 p. 98) was taken where the researcher picked 
which companies to approach. As an unforeseen advantage, one of the interviewees took it upon 
themselves to suggest and approach more companies on behalf of the researcher for interview 
opportunities, creating a light snowball effect to the sampling (Oates 2006 p. 98) and bolstering 
confidence after the results of the questionnaire. Because the researcher waited to see if the recipients 
of the questionnaire would want to invite for interviews, the rest were done later in the research period 
and so only a total of four interviews were had that could be arranged through time and interest from 
the companies approached.  
An audio recorder was used for all four interviews. All interviewees gave express permission for the 
researcher to use the device when asked at the beginning of the interview. They were all also informed 
that the audio recording would be deleted at the hand-in of the master thesis. 
Three out of four interviewees were informed that the findings would be kept anonymous and they had 
the right not to answer any questions they did not wish to. The missing was a mistake made by the 
researcher in conducting the interview, but anonymity is still kept and none were pressured into 
providing an answer. 
The interviews were carried out at the interviewee’s work place, at an office room where the interviewer 
and interviewee sat at opposite sides of the table. Such a seating is not ideal as it would suggest 
confrontation (Oates 2006 p. 191) but it fell naturally in place at each interview. Only the fourth had a 
natural seating that allowed a more ninety-degree angle between interviewer and interviewee. 
Introduction and brief small talk were done at the beginning of each to ease any tension (Oates 2006 p. 
191) and an open body-language was kept throughout the interview by the interviewer (arms at the 
sides of the chair and never crossed, back straight, legs apart). Active listening through eye-contact and 
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mirroring was also done to set the interviewee at ease and questions were kept in a neutral tone not to 
lead the interviewees on, as recommended by Oates (2006 p. 192-193). 
The interviews were ended with an open question asking the interviewee to raise any points not 
addressed and thanking them for their time as advised by Oates (2006 p. 193). 
See appendix 2 for the interview questions translated from Norwegian. Follow-up questions as a part of 
the semi-structured interview have not been added there. 
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Section 3: Results 
3.1 Results from Questionnaire 
 
After three weeks without any responses to the questionnaire or any emails regarding the same, an 
email was sent IKT-Norge politely asking if the questionnaire had been sent. Someone delegated to add 
it to their email letter had forgotten, for which they apologized deeply and promised to send it as soon 
as possible. 
Once two more weeks had passed without a reply to the questionnaire, another email was sent asking 
the same. This time they informed that the questionnaire had been sent out the same day they 
discovered they had forgotten. The questionnaire had been in circulation since the 23rd of April. 
Unfortunately, even now at the end of the research, not a single reply whether by response to the 
questionnaire or email to the researcher has been received as a result of this data generation method. 
The only brief and unhelpful response to it was made by the researcher, testing that the questionnaire 
was indeed operational prior to sending an email to IKT-Norge the first time around. 
3.2 Interviews 
 
A total of four interviews were done at different organizations within Trondheim. The data collected 
from the interviews have been separated into four themes. Below is a brief overview of what the role 
and organization of the different interviewees. 
 
Interview # Role Organization 
1 Test-developer Large company 
2 Manager Consultancy firm 
3 Manager 
Developer 
Consultancy firm 
4 Security Expert Large Company 
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3.2.1 Agile Method 
 
The first interviewee worked as a tester and developer at a larger company in Norway. In their project 
they used the standard Scrum with two weeks’ sprints consisting of eight days of work, one day for demo 
and one day of planning the next sprint. They also held daily scrum meetings (standups) and had 
designated roles within the project team such as product owner and scrum master. The members of the 
project team were split into three different roles: testing, development and public 
relations/architecture/project leader. Same methodology was used for projects with high security 
requirements, with the mention that all of their projects have high security requirements and the current 
one higher than ordinary. The high demand came as a result of moving sensitive data from an internal 
secure network into the cloud and back again, while making an index in the cloud for the information. 
While having only been working there since the beginning of the year, the interviewee believed that they 
always use Scrum without thinking about changing or experimenting with other agile methods. In 
mention of security requirements, the interviewee said: 
“Use it [Scrum] always. Whether you have security requirements or not, we have 
not considered to change methodology for that reason.” 
At previous workplaces, the interviewee mentioned they had used Kanban and Scrum and earlier still 
had begun using agile towards the end after the waterfall methodology. For the current company it was 
believed to be no contemplation for anything else than Scrum and that you had to use an agile 
methodology because that is how the world is now. 
“I feel it is more fun at Scrum. That you get out results.” 
Interviewee did not believe there had been any changes made to the methodology to fit it to 
development but rather the other way around. Development had been fit to the methodology itself to 
allow for shorter iterations. While the method was not believed to be an advantage related to security, 
with Scrum there was the benefit that you could always see that you are making what you want to make. 
You know all the time where you are in the development process. For them the methodology affected 
how they worked with security, in that they added security gradually over the course of the project. 
The major challenge with the agile method was said to be getting the customer involved in the project. 
Usually you would want highly competent customers involved in the project but if they were highly 
competent, they usually did not have time to be involved. An example for such customers where you 
could expect difficulties in getting help was the government or other officials. For their current project 
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they had an internal customer, a project manager from the company itself. That was also thought to be a 
possible weakness for their method. Due to the short iterations and to have a demo to show towards the 
end, there was a risk that they would not get the security requirements fulfilled on what they made 
because they had to make insecure versions to show off. 
Something that could go outside their method was a lot of spec work having to be done at the beginning 
of the project, where they had to make plans for security for longer durations than a single sprint. 
Because of the high security demands, they had to take the security of the whole project into 
consideration.  
 
In interviewee #2’s division in Trondheim they used agile development for the majority of their projects. 
Agile development was defined as projects wherein there was no set scope, time or budget; but 
continuous assessment and an iterative development with something to ship at the end. Within those 
boundaries, it was said that the majority of what they did was agile but some projects had more locked 
frames than others. While the different projects used different methods, most of their developers had a 
basic education in Scrum and had the methodology as a starting point for adaptation to the different 
projects depending on the project’s requirements. Their project teams ranged between two or three up 
to seven or eight people, with some projects distributed to other divisions while others were done in-
house. There was also a difference in the amount of customer collaboration in the different projects. All 
the variations posed different requirements of the methodology but most started with Scrum wherein 
there is a backlog with prioritized tasks taken from the top for development to be done within the week. 
The sprints were ranging in length from one week up to four. They did not follow Scrum by the book but 
ended up with a mix between Scrum and Kanban adapted to each project. 
They used to follow Scrum more by the book back in 2010 when working on a project with high security 
requirements. To accomplish it they added Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle for Agile 
Development (Sullivan 2010) as a component and starting point, especially the first year the project was 
established. Because of the high focus on security, one member of the four developing the project had it 
as a special responsibility. One of the activities mentioned that was especially done was threat modeling 
of the user stories, where they for each had to consider what to keep in mind on matters of security. 
Because security was a very important feature for the customer, it was not hard to get it prioritized in 
the backlog for the project.   
“Often you experience that non-functional requirements get down-prioritized. 
Things like performance, security, robustness. Less mature customers or customers 
who doesn’t have a focus on that, have a tendency to like all the time want a new 
functionality and then it can be difficult for us as producer to balance and say that 
now maybe we must prioritize things you may not see at once, but must be there.” 
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In their project with high security requirements the customer was so focused on security that the team 
did not need to sell it in, and instead could work on it from day one. The security work was adapted to 
their method. Another security measure they do in their projects is a security review by an internal and 
professional group focused on security. They spend a day on the review going through the project and 
looking for known vulnerabilities. On the high security project an external review was also done by an 
expert company, which expressed that the reviewers could not find much to mention. To accomplish this 
level of security they had followed the guidelines in Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle, had a 
member on the team focused especially on the security and had a customer who knew well the 
importance of security. Due to the high focus, the development team was always attentive in learning 
the security mechanisms in the frameworks they utilized. For instance they used a framework from 
Microsoft called MVC where most standard security mechanisms are default. You really had to try hard 
to not get escaped input, and cross-site-request-forgery was easy to deny. Things that used to be a 
hassle could be removed by the use of the framework, so they paid attention to what security 
functionality was offered by it. 
The reason for choosing Scrum in their project was due to security being one of the non-functional 
requirements, the other requirements were equally important and to better be able to deliver the 
project when the specification of it was unclear. While the customer had an idea on how the system 
should be, there was much uncertainty related to its functionality. Were they to use a more traditional 
waterfall method the interviewee said: 
“We would not be able to design the whole solution ahead of time and then one 
considered the amount of security. When that is said we did do comparably much 
design on the security part early on precisely because it is a non-functional 
requirement. It is possible to think it a little bit through and build it without 
considering too much functionality.” 
Interviewee mentioned how to do logging, how to make it anonymous, how to encrypt for databases 
and how to do authentication as examples of functionality they considered early on. This was all 
established from the beginning without the customer prioritizing it up or down. The project became agile 
because even if the security part was important, the other functionalities were equally uncertain so they 
could not design the system ahead of time. 
The big difference for the method now is that since the project has moved from development to 
management and further development, they no longer spend time threat modeling everything. As a 
security review done externally resulted in everything looking good, they now focus on the baseline 
established so as long as everything new is established within the concepts set and do not introduce 
anything new, then security is kept within the solution. The established and reviewed parts are not 
touched. Any new functionality follows the same patterns as previous methods to mitigate OWASP 
threats. Because the development team is down to one man, there are no dedicated resources put for 
security and no Scrum standups. After the delivery of the project, it is more a matter of getting feedback 
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from the end-users and to see if there are any bugs to be fixed or new features desired added. So the big 
difference came to whether the project was in development or in management. 
At the question whether there had been any challenges for projects of high security because of the agile 
development, the interviewee replied: 
“No, do not think that was the difficulty. What was more a challenge was maybe 
the lack of knowledge on methods for security because that was something the 
customer asked for. They wanted to know like how are you as producers going to 
have a work method that ensures we make a secure solution.” 
Since this was something the project team had little knowledge of beyond the technical aspects, they 
had to learn how to add it to their development method. 
The advantage in using agile methodology for the project was that there was no clear order on what was 
to be made. Nobody had a good overview of it all because of a large and complicated rule set behind the 
system to be developed. The project was founded upon the freedom not to have to know how 
everything fit together and having to estimate it all in advance, with a given timeframe and testing at the 
end. Instead the project demanded a lot of testing throughout development, as laws and regulations 
affected functionality and the interpretation of how it should function, which could be different between 
customer and developers. They would not have been able to work that way with a waterfall method, as 
the numerous bugs discovered would require them to go a long way back in the development method. 
 
The third organization and second consultancy firm also used Scrum in nearly all their projects, in 
different shapes. While they did use the same in projects with higher security requirements, they rarely 
worked on projects with such a high demand for security. It did feature as a part of most projects and as 
an example given they found it relevant to secure web applications against ordinary OWASP threats. As 
such security is an element in what they do but rarely high on the project requirement list, as the 
customer is usually more focused on functionality. They use Scrum due to its adaptability in 
development, allowing the customer to change their mind. 
 “It is so that agile development is seen as more efficient than traditional 
organization forms in a development project.” 
They use different variations of agile development with Kanban being discussed. For them the question 
revolves around whether to use sprints or not, if it is important to have them or if you can work 
continuously instead. While they have adapted Scrum for each project, they have not made changes to 
the method. A challenge they have seen is that it is not easy to keep to locked sprints, it possibly being 
better to use continuous scrums instead of sprint iterations to add quick changes. 
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Challenges coming from the agile methodology for high security projects have never been an issue and 
they have not experienced the security requirements having been treated differently than others. The 
challenge lay in being allowed time to work on a non-functional requirement that is not so easy to see, as 
security is often one of the non-functional requirement similar to performance, availability and user-
friendliness. It is a matter of getting time to work on it during the sprint, as often you work with 
functionality instead. The point is to keep within the absolute limits of security; you cannot let a security 
requirement remain in the backlog unimplemented. 
 
The fourth company interviewed also made use of Scrum but the interviewee said that you never follow 
an agile standard to the letter. They worked on a large project with longer iterations, set up for agile 
methodology with user stories, prioritization of the work to be done and implementation of what is on 
the top of the list. The most important guidelines for architecture, design and solution was made from 
the beginning, and then agile development was done iteratively; with definition and prioritization of 
user-stories, implementation and testing of them. The most important elements were made first then 
the rest was built. 
The only change for the methodology used was some adjustments to the daily meetings. They also used 
the same method on projects with higher security requirements. 
For the security expert interviewed, it was important to set in security from the very beginning. Starting 
in the design phase of the project and ensuring the security requirements are in place from early 
development. It was also important that risk assessment had been done and there was good knowledge 
of security requirement mechanisms among the developers. But the implementation of security 
functionality and to implement software securely was prioritized in the same manner as the rest of the 
requirements.  
“That we should have a signed solution is prioritized in the product line on the 
same lines as other functional aspects of the code. So security functionality goes in 
the backlog and is prioritized equally to other requirements, but with the higher 
priorities on the top.” 
It was said that you must have the security requirements in place and the developers must know what 
the code they are making should do and how critical for security the component made is in relation to 
others. Beyond that the same method is used. Security-requirements, -functionality and –testing are put 
into the product line alongside other tasks, even if they are done externally. 
The role of the security expert for this project had been as an ad-hoc resource called upon when 
important security decisions had to be made. The interviewee had not been a part of the sprint planning 
meetings or set the security requirements early in the project, as they had only joined the project half a 
year ago. 
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When it came to challenges for the method, the interviewee had to answer in a more general manner: 
“And the challenge could be… it is always difficult in the interface, both between 
project team and between modules in the project. So that is the most difficult part 
from a security perspective. To get the interface to work. One knows well what 
happen in one’s own module or component, but how it works together with other 
components is always what is difficult.” 
To see the whole on an information security basis and how the information is to be handled from A to B 
in an information system was what was difficult. While not something each developer must have an 
overview of, someone on the project team must know it. 
The biggest advantage of Scrum has been being able to plan to a certain level then letting it remain to 
the team, the priority mechanism in the project and communication with the customer to ensure the 
customer gets what they want. In earlier projects with the waterfall method the organizations hired to 
implement the system would get too stuck in what was planned and written in the requirements that it 
ended up with a system they did not really want. Another advantage lies in a better day for the 
developers because they have a schedule to keep. Knowing what they have committed themselves to do 
each month and the goals of the project. For the company it was also an internal competition between 
development teams on which manages to get done the most with good quality. A last advantage 
mentioned was getting a continuous motivation to get the work done and more awareness of what each 
team had developed through the status meetings. 
On the security side the interviewee said: 
“That I will be careful about argumenting for or against. I cannot say if it has 
become better or worse by using an agile methodology from a security 
perspective. What I see from before my time is that a lot of good security 
measures have been done both on the module level related to crypto solutions 
and mechanisms, and in relation to for instance code review from a security 
perspective. That type of things. But then the question is if this had been done if 
one did not use an agile method, that I cannot say. So whether agile has led to 
more secure or less secure code is impossible to answer.” 
In summary: 
 Interview #1 Interview #2 Interview #3 Interview #4 
Uses agile 
method? 
Yes (Scrum) Yes (Scrum) Yes (Scrum) Yes (Scrum) 
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Uses same 
method in high 
security projects? 
Yes Yes Yes (does not have 
high security 
projects but would 
use same) 
Yes 
Reason: How the world is. Uncertain/changing 
requirements. 
Adaptability, 
giving the 
customer what 
they want. 
See advantages. 
Method been 
changed? 
No (but long 
security spec work 
outside) 
Yes (method mix) No. Yes (daily 
meetings) 
Challenges for the 
method? 
Customer 
collaboration. 
Internal customer. 
Insecure demoes. 
Lack of good 
security methods. 
Time to work on 
non-functional 
requirements. 
Keeping within 
sprints. 
Overview and 
interface between 
components. 
Advantages from 
the method? 
Project 
development 
awareness. Create 
what is wanted. 
Adaptability. None mentioned. Customer gets 
what they want. 
Awareness and 
motivation for 
developer. 
 
3.2.2 Differences on Agile principles 
 
Interview #1 
Customer collaboration 
They have an internal customer that sets the requirements high for security, on the level of nobody 
gaining access to someone else’s documents, not being able to fetch something you do not have access 
to, all communication being encrypted, only real user accounts allowed so it is known who it is, no 
logging of data in the system and other logs should not contain sensitive information. On the developer 
side it is another detail level, where it is decided how strong cipher to use and who to keep the access 
keys. The customer sets four or five security requirements but they are usually broad. There are also 
internal requirements from the company itself that has been heightened over the year, on matters of 
what to encrypt and where to encrypt it. The interviewee believed this had increased after Snowden. 
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“[I] Believe that maybe internal requirements [for security] often are stricter than 
external requirements.” 
On the detail level they have plenty and specific strict requirements from the company itself. 
Openness to change in requirements 
The strict high-level security requirements are locked and not something they mess around with. 
Functional requirements when it comes to that the project should be able to scale is not changed. They 
could probably change the details about the security requirements but the stricter ones have been 
reviewed so much by the company itself that it would take a lot before they dare change them. 
“If we do not fulfill the security requirements then nobody can use it [the 
system].” 
Discussion of requirement change 
The security requirements have always been at the foundation remaining stable, so they have not been 
up for discussion. They do not use a requirement specification but rather goals to be accomplished. The 
goals have been brought up more than security requirements at discussion meetings, especially if the 
goals had a time limit. If something was to happen in five seconds and it took five point three, it would 
usually be fine. On the other side if fifty documents were to be encrypted and two pass unencrypted, it 
would not be acceptable. It was not a case that as long as ninety-nine point nine percent was encrypted 
it would be fine. On the security side no lenience was given to the machine being busy or something only 
happening in that specific incidence. 
Discussion of process improvement 
They use the same process every second week with a retrospective after the sprint, where it is discussed 
what was done and what could be improved. This regardless to whether the project had high or low 
security requirements. 
Difference in delivery of working software 
Instead of mentioning any difference, interviewee explained their process of delivery. First the build is 
sent to a few thousand internal users and if it works for them it is expanded to a thousand more. Then a 
hundred thousand. If everything works well a small number of people in different countries and 
continents are given the build, a number that gradually increases. Those who receive the build get the 
new code every time there is an update. The end users usually receive the software at the end through 
CD or download, estimated to come every second year or so. 
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Interview #2 
Customer collaboration 
There was a major difference in customer collaboration depending on the size of the project and 
matureness of the customer. Professional customers with good knowledge of information technology 
would have requirements to security. In the project with high security spoken of in the interview, the 
customer had an employee whose sole role was focused on security. It fell naturally for the customer to 
have clear demands to security, but some may have been unrealistic or in a strict sense not necessary. 
“Sometimes it can be easy to like read about all the security mechanisms that 
exist and cross that we want this, this, this, this and this without considering the 
consequences and if it makes the security any better.” 
At smaller customers they had experienced few if any requirements to security due to a lack of 
knowledge from the customers. It was then the company’s responsibility to make the requirements and 
inform the customer that security needed to be prioritized, which touched upon the issue of discussing 
functional and non-functional requirements with the customer in agile development. 
Occasionally they experienced problems with getting anonymous test data. Most the time the focus lies 
on security when the system is in production and it kept becoming an issue that the company had to 
write code to get the test data anonymous themselves. They would rather not have their test 
environments full of sensitive data. 
Openness to requirement change 
Interviewee said it depended on their contract. If it was a set price contract expecting them to deliver 
software to a given price, they had to handle a change request notice process for the changes to be 
done. This was especially the case for security requirements as any new additions could come with a 
huge cost. On their agile Scrum projects they are more open for changes and it becomes the company’s 
responsibility to explain what the change will cost the customer, how important it is, if it can be done 
later and if there are simpler alternatives. On the same level as other functionality. The company keeps 
itself to a high level of professionalism for their projects, not allowing anything to pass without there 
being at least a minimum of security mechanisms if it is to be put up on the internet. 
Discussion of requirement change 
System requirements were said to be more likely discussed as the security requirements were often 
given ahead of time and were non-functional. They usually did not experience much politic of wishes 
from the customer when it came to non-functional requirements. Often they had to do standard 
solutions where they got far just by following good practices from ASP.net, not writing their own 
encryption, use standard Java.net, use SSL, test against OWASP top ten threats and general guidelines 
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when it came to web solutions. There was usually more discussion surrounding the functional 
requirements and they were open for change. 
Discussion of process improvement 
No difference between high or low security projects. In the past they followed Scrum a bit closer, 
considering the security part and discussing how it worked for their project. A lot of code review was 
done to begin with and checking implementation against recommended guideline. But this was all said to 
be done on the same lines as other functionality. 
Difference in delivery of working software 
Security played an important part in the difference of delivery. For projects without high requirements 
on security they delivered working software on each commit. In these projects the most important thing 
for the customer was to get ideas tested out and receive feedback from real end-users. What they called 
innovation projects. For those projects, it was difficult to know if what they made was right without 
testing it. 
“It was within the medical sector so you would believe there was an enormous 
security focus. But what we instead did was to design the solution in such a way 
that there were never any huge consequences if someone got ahold of the data 
because no personal data was used. So instead of operating with social security 
numbers and names we had series of numbers that could be used in an external 
system to connect to people if one wants, but one could never get hold of the data 
to compare and connect them to people. There was nothing to identify someone in 
the system.” 
In such projects there was always a plan for how the security should function, especially authentication 
and integration to the back of the system. As long as they followed the architecture principles, security 
could be delayed so functional code could be delivered daily. 
The high security project on the other hand was not put to test against real user before a long time had 
passed. 
“It has always been a problem with agile development that you should have 
shippable code but it ends up usually potentially shippable. In practice it is rarely 
set for production before one has a large chunk of the system done. It is often 
what is different between iterative and incremental development, that is iterative 
is the thought that you should like continuously improve the production set and 
incremental is that you only make first a little bit and then a little bit, then you set 
the whole part for production.”  
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For the high security project, it was more the case of being an incremental project where functionality 
was continuously developed but could not be put to production because the whole package was not 
there. Due to technical complexity they were early in a test environment and prioritized that. The 
thought was to grab hold of difficult tasks early and not just believe they would be able to manage it. 
Interviewee said that the reason for doing it like that was not only due to security but because the 
customer wanted everything tested completely in the test environment and get end-users to come in 
and test it there, not roll it out to real users.  
 
Interview #3 
Customer collaboration 
In their case the customer has to set the requirements. In the cases where the customer did not have the 
required competence, they as the professional part had to contribute especially when it came to non-
functional requirements the customer did not see.  
Openness to change in requirements 
Interviewees did not see a difference in openness but mentioned they usually did not work on projects 
with a high demand for security. No experience with any difference in their own projects but would 
maybe look differently on it had they done projects for the military or banks. 
Discussion of requirement change 
No difference. From the customer’s side there may be someone with a focus on security, but most are 
concerned about functionality and it is also there changes are made most often. Security requirements 
are usually derived from a ruleset that details the security level, or arise as a result of threat modeling 
during the project. The security requirements begin as something abstract and then become more 
concrete, which fits agile. The challenge was keeping the view of the entire project and securing the 
transition between abstract to something specific, which was a danger in agile projects as one focuses 
more on implementation. Something the traditional waterfall method did better by settling everything in 
advance. 
Discussion of process improvement 
No difference. They treat security requirements the same way as other non-functional requirements. 
Difference in delivery of working software 
No difference as they treat the security requirements like other requirements. It was speculated that a 
higher requirement to security would require a part of the team to focus on security and it would have 
been a different dynamic for delivering software, but they have no experience with such situations. 
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Interview #4 
Customer collaboration 
In their case the project included several consultancy firms in addition to internal resources on the 
development side which all were a part of architecture and implementation. So there was only a subtle 
difference between customer and developer. It had been up to the project managers consisting of both 
interns and externs to both prioritize and lead the project, where the customer-consultant dialogue had 
been very close. Interviewee expressed difficulty in answering this question as the customer had been a 
part of development. 
Openness to change in requirements 
On the security side they followed the principles in the guidelines of The Norwegian Data Protection 
Authority for treatment of sensitive personal information, and how it is handled from security zone to 
security zone. On that part they were very strict and it would take a lot to be convinced the guidelines 
needed to be broken.  The security requirements of the module were more open when it came to 
functionality. 
“Many claim from a research perspective that security requirements should tell 
you what to do but not how. That is, what is the requirement is important but it 
should be up to those who implement it to propose how it is best done. For 
instance a security requirement could say you should have crypto in the 
communication tunnel from A to B, and then it is up to the developer to say ‘Okay, 
here we will use asymmetrical cryptography, here we will use symmetrical, we will 
use 256-bit keys,’ all the detailed things.” 
As long as the principles are kept and it satisfies the requirements of performance, the security 
requirements could be changed. A warning was here given that it did not take many seconds difference 
before it reverberated to other components of the system, slowing them down. 
Discussion of requirement change 
Interviewee did not have enough insight to answer. 
Discussion of process improvement 
As the interviewee joined the project late, they felt it was difficult to answer as most had already been 
established in earlier discussions. For the question, those early meetings would be the most important 
for influencing improvement to the process. 
Difference in delivery of working software 
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The most important difference came to the way the software was tested. In security tests, deployment 
and how often code is sent from the project team to management. They did not deliver continuously to 
the end-user before it had been thoroughly tested. It was not like other agile projects, for instance a web 
application or an internet store where a new feature is made and deployed at once. Instead they made 
the code, presented it for their internal customer and did not implement it in the production 
environment before a larger release. 
  
Difference in… Interview #1 Interview #2 Interview #3 Interview #4 
… Customer 
collaboration 
No (internal 
customer) 
Yes (varies). No. No (but project 
had overlapping 
customer-
developer) 
… Openness to 
change 
Yes (high locked 
security) 
No (for agile). No. Yes (security 
principles 
maintained) 
… Requirement  
change discussion 
Yes (less likely to 
adjust security) 
Less for security. No. Unknown. 
… Process 
improvement 
discussion 
No. No. No. Unknown. 
… Working 
software delivery 
Unknown. Yes. No. Yes. 
 
 
3.2.3 Requirement assurance 
 
To ensure the security requirements had been met, the company in the first interview had an internal 
group reviewing security as a main contributor. As well, everything put in was coded in full and tested. 
Automated tests ran to ensure there were no access violations, wherein you had access to information 
you should not have. 
Page 28 of 44 
 
They did not use an external part to test the security but did it internally. The interviewee did not know if 
other internal groups were used as well but mentioned it was possible they had other company divisions 
in USA to test security. Penetration testing had been done in a different company’s project the 
interviewee had worked on, where one division often tested another’s project. 
 
In interviewee 2’s case, four concrete measures had been done to ensure the security requirements had 
been met. First, a developer had had security as their responsibility. Second, they did a code review 
where one step was the security aspect, in which they talked through how the code was made and how 
it had been secured. The third was the use of an internal security expert to run security testing for a day. 
Fourth was an external company hired to test the security. They also built automated testes. 
“In ASP.Net if you are to post a form from a website to a controller you have to 
declare the method with HTTPPost which says it can receive a post request, much 
like a notation in Java. Then you have something called… another notation which 
says this post needs to have a cross-site request forgery token to avoid cross-site 
request forgery attacks… and we had as policy that all posts needed to have that 
unless they were written on one or another exception list, that we have a very 
specific reason to post without them. But it could happen that a developer forgot 
to put that attribute on. So we made an automated unit test which scanned all the 
controllers, found methods with HTTPPost, and checked if it also had the cross-site 
request forgery attribute, if not the test failed. So if someone had forgotten it then 
the whole build collapsed and you got a message at once that either you had to 
add it or you had to add it to an exception list. You had then documented that you 
had taken an explicit choice.” 
The company tried to get as much as possible automated related to security testing. In addition an 
internal group of five to seven people would do security review for projects for a day’s duration. This 
group focused only on this security work and worked outside other projects. It was unknown whether 
they used an external part to test the system. Such was usually done on a case to case basis, on initiative 
from the customer. 
 
Third company mentioned having good routines to check the security requirements, with tests, 
inspections, code reviews and automated testing depending on the situation and project. They did not 
use external parts to test the security, but the developer interviewed mentioned having been a part of 
projects where they had hired in an external part for penetration testing. It was also something 
recommended to do. 
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Interviewee 4 said that assurance for the security requirements was done through having requirements, 
module descriptions and update module descriptions which reflect what had been implemented as the 
most important process. To have the solution documented, which was also the most difficult part. The 
security expert used the documentation as a means of verification when approaching the developers and 
asking what they had actually made. In addition they had security tests and extern parts that did security 
review based on the documentation. 
They also used neutral third parties for code revision and penetration testing of the solution. 
 
 Interview #1 Interview #2 Interview #3 Interview #4 
Assurance 
methods 
Internal group 
code review, 
automated tests,  
Security expert, 
code review, 
testing day. 
Tests, code 
review, good 
routines. 
Occasionally 
automated tests. 
Requirements, 
documentation. 
Uses external part 
to test security? 
No (internal, 
possibly other 
divisions) 
Yes (customer 
initiative, internal 
as well) 
No. Yes. 
 
 
3.2.4 Topics brought up 
 
Interview #1 
The advantage of agile is that you adapt to the world swifter. The drawback is that in practice 
development is done less agile, in that you use a process on the outside that takes longer time. Security 
was also not put in to the additions to begin with, as it gets harder to code and test with the security 
added. So such usually came afterwards. Another advantage lies in being more conscious to changes but 
in practice the security requirements are perhaps the least agile thing they work on, since they are not as 
open to change. Some security related tasks are drawn out of the sprint, such as the early specification 
phase, discussions with other groups, meetings and review. Or the tasks get moved from sprint to sprint. 
It is something they experiment on and could likely fit into an agile method. 
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“If we had had an external customer and we had only a demo of something that 
worked and said ‘No, now we will only put on security’. What you see as the 
difference is if the grade is green instead of yellow, right? And then we spend 
months on that. It would be a lot more difficult to… [convince the customer that it 
was important].” 
 
Interview #2 
One difficulty lay in test data. In their experience the customer is sloppy when it comes to test data and 
good procedures to make test data anonymous. Another challenge is the prioritization of functional and 
non-functional requirements, and depending on customer matureness it can be difficult to prioritize 
security. 
As a subjective view  from the interviewee, the focus security has had in mass media the last two years 
has made it easier for security to be prioritized, that the customer has been more alert when there has 
been a lot of writings about security and wanted to know if it affected them on meetings. In the past 
security revolved around windows updates whereas now there are databases and passwords on the 
loose, stock companies vulnerable and focus on security events in the newspapers. So it has become 
easier to prioritize security and made it less something they had to sell the customer. 
To have safe defaults in the development frameworks has been very useful and external reports have 
complimented that the company followed good practice, because the framework laid the groundwork. 
There are continuously new challenges related to security but also new technology that makes it easier 
to withstand most attacks. However, new attack vectors keep cropping up. You are never done working 
with security. 
New developers may not understand fully the frameworks and that can be a challenge. If you do not 
understand how it works, it is easy to make mistakes. It is important to know how the technology do 
security. 
 
Interview #3 
Security has to be tested from end to end in the whole solution. It is hard to make automated unit tests 
to secure some components when you may have to put them together with others to see that it works. 
This is a usual challenge for automated tests. Security tests also face the challenge that security 
functionality is not visible, so there is a danger of it being removed when code is changed. The tests need 
to be able to pick that up. It is also difficult to set up a test environment for penetration testing as it 
assumes you have a large amount of mechanisms in place, something you usually do not have until the 
program is set for production and then it is beyond the agile process anyway. Either you get a long loop 
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outside the agile process or you are already done with the project. Some functionality you cannot test 
within the agile method, such as performance at a hundred thousand users. 
Test data has always been a problem as in most cases you hold data you are not allowed to handle, so it 
becomes a security issue in treating sensitive data as nearly all consumer data is sensitive. Such as 
handling social security numbers outside secure environments. Laws are occasionally bypassed in such 
cases. 
In response to a question about how hard it is to convince customers of the need for security, they 
responded that it is never considered nice by the customer to pay for non-functional requirements and 
that is where the problem lies. Usually persuasion happens on two stages where first revolves around 
expressing awareness and need, the other about getting finance to do the changes as the customers may 
have a hard time considering it necessary. It is usually here, they say, that more compromises are done 
than on the functional level. 
 
Interview #4 
It is an eternal question for discussion what is best between traditional and agile development on a 
security perspective. A topic which would need more research to determine. 
There had been no problems with test data, but what they used depended on how it was to be tested 
and if it was sent out to a third party. They used their own data for internal testing. Different practice 
was used at third parties, depending on the test environments they used. 
“Information is information and, it should be secured in the same way regardless 
if it is for test or development.” 
It has not been difficult to get test data on their own solutions. They take a sample of the data available 
and perform procedures so they can be tested in a good manner. 
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Section 4: Discussion 
 
It is unclear why the questionnaire did not receive any results. IKT-Norge was approached both to be 
able to spread the questionnaire to a far greater amount of companies and to have a professional 
backing making it more likely the companies would respond. It was expected to not get a huge amount 
of respondents due to the expectance of between ten to thirty percent answers and security being a 
sensitive issue. Receiving zero responses was shocking. 
While it is unknown the exact number of companies the questionnaire reached, it is fair to assume the 
number is in the hundreds since IKT-Norge is an interest group for those who work with ICT as a 
business. Likely their newsletter reached one or more employees at each of the companies that may not 
be able to respond to the questions posed by the questionnaire or simply skip it entirely, but it should 
not be an entirely too big leap of logic that there would be some company wherein the questionnaire 
would be passed on to someone who could answer. While the questionnaire contained some open 
textboxes for questions that would increase the time for answering it, in itself the questionnaire was 
short enough that it should not take too long to answer. Reviews alongside the supervisor, the pilot 
study and IKT-Norge’s own brief look would have weeded out that danger. The issue of security 
sensitiveness when it comes to a questionnaire is a more difficult matter to assess but there was nothing 
too specific there that should raise an issue. Whether SurveyMonkey is regarded in a bad light for the 
business world in Norway is unknown but could also pose a reason to the non-existent responses. To put 
it simply, the researcher has no idea why it did not produce any results and another round would likely 
have resulted in the same without knowing why there were no answers in the first place. At least from 
the assumption that if everything was fine, there would have been at least one respondent due to the 
sample size. 
Concluding that Norwegian companies are not willing to share information regarding security 
experiences would be easy but both the research of the pre-project study and the openness in the 
interviews speak otherwise. It is likely as a result that it is easier to trust someone met in person if the 
security topic was the issue. 
Something that was noticeable in the interviews when asking about the differences in agile principles 
was that the questions were sometimes not answered in full. Not everyone compared high security 
projects with other projects when it came to the different principles, so the questions themselves may 
have been too broad and would be better split up. While they were in a different form in the 
questionnaire with Likert scales, it could be the questions were too unclear 
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To answer the first research question it must be determined whether any of the four companies are 
deviating from the standard methodology. It is important to keep in mind that most agile methodology 
are standard methods to be shaped as the development team requires and pose guidelines to follow. For 
instance a very strict stand on an agile method is that it should produce no documentation at all, as agile 
is meant to avoid long sessions of planning and instead allow the developers to begin to develop from 
the get-go. In some cases this may not be possible at all. As it is mentioned in the manifesto: 
“*… we have come to value+ Working software over comprehensive documentation… 
That is, while there is value in the items on the right, we value the items on the left more” (Beck, 
K. et al. 2001) 
Nowhere does it say no documentation at all. So that alone is not enough to call it deviating. 
In the first interviewed company’s situation, the agile methodology had shaped how they approached 
development. Instead of fitting the method to them, they fit themselves to the method. There were 
different roles, a sprint process, daily standups and reviews at the end. Software was developed with a 
demo at the end of the sprint. Some notes of concern method-wise came from the mention that security 
work was drawn out of the sprints. There was a lot of specification work done at the beginning of the 
project due to the high security, work with security tended to be delayed from sprint to sprint to allow 
for demoes that were insecure, meetings and discussions and code review were done outside in a 
separate process. While work with specification ahead of the project is, as has already been argued, not 
enough to call a deviation and is a useful technique security-wise; leaving security parts of the user story 
in the backlog over time and taking security work out of the sprint itself is breaking the method. The 
sprint planning meeting is the place where the security work to be done is discussed and set for the 
iteration, it would seem that the first company take that out of the process. If it is so, the company is 
deviating from the Scrum method. This is similar to another security firm’s experience incorporating 
security into Scrum, where they had to reshape their approach to fit the Scrum methodology (O’Boyle, R. 
and Eng, C. 2013). Related to RQ1 this appears to be nonconformity done for reasons of security, but as 
said by the interviewee they could likely fit it into their agile method. Because of the high security 
requirements coming from both the company itself and the internal customer, in this case it would seem 
security is strengthened as it appears to be zero tolerance for mistakes, even if the iteration demoes are 
insecure. The results given the end-users are so thoroughly tested and reviewed that it should not be a 
problem. 
The second company explicitly stated they did not follow Scrum by the book but had it as a starting point 
and adapted it for their different projects, ending up with something close to Scrum and Kanban. So 
there is no question that they have deviated from the method. Interestingly, they followed Scrum more 
by the book when working on a high security project and had added on a security component that could 
be fit into the methodology easily. This as a result of the customer wanting to know how their 
development method would assure security was implemented well. It would seem related to RQ1 that a 
more by the book development was done specifically due to the security need. Once the development 
had been done and the project entered a management phase, they drew back on both allocated 
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resources and method use as the foundation had been laid and anything new would fall within the 
tested and proven methods or processes  in the software. For RQ1 this means that the deviation is not 
done as a cause of security but development phase change. It does not affect security in any noticeable 
manner, as any new security features fall under the same secure patterns tested. 
The second consultancy firm, the third company interviewed, had made some adaptations fitting the 
method to their development but stated they had done no changes to the method itself. They fit in 
security just like any other non-functional requirement into their agile process. One thing to remark 
related to this is that they did not work on projects with high security requirements. Judging from the 
rest that was told about their method, it would seem they keep it agile without deviating and so is not 
relevant for the first research question. 
As for the fourth company, the interviewee said that one never follows an agile method to the letter but 
could only come up with the daily meetings as a change to the methods in Scrum. It is unknown in what 
way or how the daily meetings have been changed. What is known is that they use a third party for 
penetration testing and code review. While arguably highly beneficial on a security perspective, it relies 
on someone outside the development team or customer to both work and report back their findings of 
the tests outside the sprints themselves. Penetration testing or external code review could then be 
considered as assurance methods falling outside the agile methodology, causing deviations for reasons 
of security. It is also a reason why such a question was added the questionnaire. The conclusion that 
such assurance methods fell outside the agile method was had by Beznosov and Kruchten (2004). Again, 
such a deviation from a security point is a beneficial thing and contributes to keeping the security 
requirements and is in this case the clearest reason for the deviation. Everything else beyond the 
unknown daily meetings keep within the method. 
When it comes to the second research question, it falls to consider how the principles are affected in the 
agile method when working on high security projects. Of the four companies interviewed only the first, 
second and fourth work on projects with high security requirements.  
Customer collaboration seems to be in two of three cases unaffected when working on high security 
projects. Both the two unaffected had an internal customer, so that may be the reason for it. For the one 
affected the reason seems to be due to customer matureness and knowledge related to security. When 
the customer knows little, it becomes more an issue for the consultancy firm as a professional part to 
provide the security requirements. This was also true for the third company interviewed, even if they did 
not work on high security projects. The other side of it is that the customer may demand more from the 
company. As customer collaboration is a big part of agile development and security can be seen as any 
other requirement, the fact that the customer is less or more involved on security requirements does not 
seem remarkable for the research question on its own as this could be true for other requirements as 
well depending on the customer. 
Regarding openness to change of requirements, the first and the fourth company both had either set 
requirements or principles outside the team that were more or less set in stone. The more functional 
security requirements could very well be adjusted. In the case of the second company, openness to 
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change in security requirements and other functional requirements were the very reasons for choosing 
an agile approach.  
The two interviewees of the high security projects that could answer whether there was a difference in 
the discussion of requirements both replied security requirements were discussed in a lesser degree 
than other system requirements. This was due to most security requirements either being strict or 
having been set at the beginning of the project, not being something the customer usually would change. 
As the customer is more concerned about functionality, that security requirements face little change is 
not necessarily a bad thing for agile. 
Both the two that could respond regarding discussions about process improvement with a high security 
project and the third company expressed no change whatsoever when it came to discussing how to 
make the process better in working with security requirements. The requirements were treated the 
same as the system requirements or the non-functional requirements. 
What seems to be affected most of the agile principles investigated is the delivery of working software. 
While there is no lower security project to compare with for the first interview, it was mentioned that 
security was delayed to be able to present demoes at the end of every sprint in high security projects. 
The second company would deliver software at every commit in low security projects, relying instead on 
obfuscating the information so that extracting data would be to no gain. In their high security project it 
was the customer’s wish they kept most updates in their test environment. For the fourth company, in 
contrast to a web application where a new feature and updates would be rolled out immediately, new 
functionality would not reach the end users before thorough testing and presentation, as a part of a 
larger release. Summed up high security projects seem to be slower in shipping software, due to the 
need of assurance. 
It would seem security is the result and benefit of deviating from an agile methodology judging by the 
two high security projects that did so. However, the second company kept more true to the agile 
methodology because of a security reason and the deviation happened when it would not affect security 
itself. More research would be required to know whether this is true on a larger scale. From the results 
of the pre-project study, the findings seemed to indicate that the deviation in method was a cause of 
development convenience more than a security reason. 
An argument supporting agile development methods for security-critical software is that following a 
more traditional model when the security requirements are unknown or liable to change throughout 
development is impossible without resorting to costly steps back in development, as mentioned by the 
second company. 
One issue comes from the lack of overview one has in agile development. While guidelines and the idea 
of the system are in place and for each sprint it is known what is to be done, it is harder to know how 
everything connects. On a security perspective you need to have the overview to secure the transition 
from one end to another. This is much easier in traditional methods as everything is planned out in 
advance. 
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As is the case of interviews, it is possible that the interviewees answered in a way to present their 
company in the best possible light or differently due to the researcher’s role as a student (Oates 2006 
p.189). Attempts were made to mitigate only positive responses by asking specifically if there had been 
challenges as well in their experience. It could also be the case that asking someone else in the company 
would give different answers. Another researcher may find more elaborate or different views expressed 
if the same interviews were done again. It is the researcher’s opinion that all the interviewees were 
honest and forthcoming in the answers given, showing no signs that they were ill at ease during the 
interview but rather welcomed the chance and enjoyed to talk about their experience with agile security. 
Promising anonymity likely helped mitigate reasons for the interviewee to not answer the questions 
completely and while most of the interviewees were told in advance they could refrain from answering, 
none took the privilege. Only when something was unknown did an interviewee not provide an answer 
and specifically told this was the case, as can be seen in the results of interview #4. Use of mirroring 
throughout the interviews may have encouraged certain topics or themes more than others, but the 
researcher will argue that alongside an open body language it also just as likely encouraged more 
openness. The validity of the answers found in the research can be put to question, as a fifth interview 
could likely discover something entirely else than what was found in those made. Even if the company 
interviewed was in the same region as the rest. A good rule-of-thumb for small-scale research projects is 
to have a final sample of at least thirty for surveys according to Oates (2006 p. 100). The sample size of 
this thesis is far below that due to the lack of results from the questionnaire and the time it took to 
arrange interviews. For such reasons what was discovered may not be the norm in companies working 
with agile and so the results cannot be used to generalize for a larger population, both due to the low 
sample size and the non-probability approach of the interviews. The uncertainty factor is too high. 
What could be interesting for future work is to ask specifically the companies if they had experienced 
any failures as a result of their methodology. While challenges were brought up during the interviews, 
none mentioned any specific failures they had had and such may be more telling for the study than 
successes. 
Because all the information and quotes have been translated from Norwegian, there is a risk that some 
nuances have been lost. 
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Section 5: Conclusion 
 
RQ1 
How is security affected in deviations of agile development? Are the reasons for nonconformity security 
related?  
Based on the interviews security is either more assured or unaffected in deviations of agile development. 
In two of three cases of nonconformity, the reason was due to security. Due to the low sample size of 
interviews, there could be a different answer entirely in a fourth deviation method. This is also based on 
local companies in the Trondheim region. 
While this research question was not intended as an overall generalization of companies in Norway, 
further work could see if there are different reasons not only regarding security, but also between types 
of companies and countries. A larger sample size would also be able to answer the question more firmly 
if nonconformity is due to security reasons and if security is affected in other ways in such methods. 
RQ2 
Can agile development methods be used for security-critical software? 
The sample size in this thesis and the confined region the data was gathered from makes it impossible to 
answer this question with a generalization, even if the focus is on Norwegian companies alone. Results 
seem to indicate that yes, agile development methods can be used for security-critical software and may 
be the best option between that and traditional methods if the security and other requirements are 
unknown or liable to change. However many assurance methods fall outside the agile approach and can 
affect development in a non-agile way. 
Future work could expand upon the sample size to answer the question in full, and compare the results 
to research done on traditional plan-driven software development methods and security-critical 
software to see which group of methods creates the most secure code. Or which group of methods to 
use based on project criteria. 
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions 
 
Do you utilize an agile development method in your company’s projects? 
(If so) Which one? 
Do you use the same method in projects with high security requirements? 
Why (not)? 
Has the method been changed to accommodate development? 
Has the development method had any challenges in projects with high security requirements? 
Has the development method had any advantages in projects with high security requirements? 
How often is the customer helping to create the requirements of the system, comparing system 
requirements and security requirements? 
Are there any differences as to how open to changing requirements you are, between system 
requirements and security requirements? 
Is there a difference between how often you discuss requirement changes, between system 
requirements and security requirements? 
Is there a difference between how often you hold meetings to discuss process improvement, between 
projects with high security requirements and other projects? 
Is there a difference in how often you deliver working software to the customer, comparing projects with 
high security requirements and other projects? 
How do you ensure the security requirements have been met? 
Are you using a third party to test the system? 
Is there something else related to agile development and security we have not spoken of that you would 
like to mention? 
 
